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Contents

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Philippines: Implications of Plebiscite	1	
USSR: Ready To Resume Nuclear Testing	2	
Portugal-US: Defense Debate	3	
		25X
Notes		
		25 X
Czechoslovakia: Concern Over Antiregime Violence	6	1
		25X
Western Europe: Competition for US Aircraft Vendor	7	
Suriname: Labor Strife	8	
		25X
In Brief	9	
Special Analyses		
South Korea: Human Rights Controversy Heats Up	10	0.51
		25 X 6
Eastern Europe: Halfhearted Discipline Campaigns	14	

25X1

Top Secret
4 February 1987

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ar		political position from which to ounterinsurgency, the economy,	2
		cal elections, but she must first	
Fr	ee Elections indicate that approx	e National Citizens' Movement for timately three-fourths of the voters tution. Only in the home regions of	
"r Pt	rmer President Marcos and oust no" votes barely in the majority. I nilippines, in which strong opposi vor of the constitution.		
la	voi oi the constitution.		
ne m es	ew mandate for Aquino's governr ake it more difficult for coup plot tablishment of constitutional aut	ters to justify their actions. The	
	e Aquino government is illegitima		:
ta to th wa ur di: an	heal the rift between civilians in at was underscored by the coup atch closely how she punishes the dermining Chief of Staff Ramos' scipline; leniency, however, would nong elements of the military loya	government, but it will not be easy her government and the military attempt last week. The military will be involved. Stiff punishments risk s tenuous hold on military d encourage further maneuvering all to Enrile. Over the longer run, the	
	ilitary will be looking for signs that eir concern about the growing Co	at Aquino and her advisers share communist insurgency.	
sir th co of	nce the constitution was approve ey campaigned actively for its de enstitution demonstrates that the Filipinos. The insurgents must ca	y are out of step with the majority Iculate that Aquino's new mandate	
	ay result in the military receiving gressively once the cease-fire er		•
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Soviet Nuclear Test Preparations



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Top Secret 4 February 1987

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USSR:	Ready To Resume Nuclear Testing
	The Soviets are prepared to resume nuclear testing on short notice but may wait until their international peace conference in Moscow ends on 16 February.
	TASS reacted quickly to yesterday's announcement that the US had conducted a nuclear test in Nevada, calling the action a challenge to world opinion. Immediately before the test, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov, Moscow's chief arms negotiator, had reiterated that the 18-month-old Soviet test moratorium would end with the first US nuclear test this year.
	Comment: The Soviets almost certainly will use the US test to try to
	focus deliberations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on the issue of nuclear testing. They probably will also delay a resumption of testing until after their elaborate peace conference to avoid undercutting their "peace initiatives."
	The USSR nonetheless is poised to resume a vigorous test program, having conducted extensive preparations during the moratorium. Its first weapons test could occur within two weeks of a decision to

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PORTUGAL-US:

Defense Debate

A debate on defense policy in the Portuguese parliament today may expose the government to close questioning on its security ties to the US, especially in light of recent allegations in the press that the US may have used Portugal to ship arms to anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua.

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For the past two months, the Portuguese press has been rife with reports of shipments of Portuguese arms to Iran and, more recently, to the anti-Sandinistas. The press has focused less on the government's possible complicity—the current and previous governments have denied any involvement—than on alleged US attempts to use Portugal to procure and transship arms.

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The fledgling center-left Democratic Renewal Party of former President Eanes called for the debate on defense policy several weeks ago. Under the current system, an opposition party can call for an interpellation in parliament only twice during the legislative year.

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Comment: The Democratic Renewal Party is anxious to carve out an identity for itself. It has chosen to use the defense debate to try to embarrass the minority, center-right government of Prime Minister Cavaco Silva. Given the possibility of an early election this year, the Socialists and the Communists probably will also use the debate to score points with the public.

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
The debate is likely to extend beyond Lisbon's arms export policy to broader Portuguese-US security issues, including Lisbon's concern about the declining level of US assistance, the US military's ability to transit Lajes airbase in the Azores, and possibly the longstanding dispute over the construction of a US satellite tracking station in southern Portugal. All opposition parties probably will try to capitalize on a growing public perception that the US tends to take Portugal for granted.

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In the past, successive Portuguese governments—whether of the left, right, or center—generally have favored strong security ties to the US and NATO. While the broad consensus for doing so still exists, Portugal's accession to the EC and Spain's entry into NATO are prompting the Portuguese to look increasingly to their interests in Western Europe and to scrutinize more closely their ties to the US.


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
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Concern Over Antiregime Violence	
The recent bombing of the Czechoslovak Communist Party's headquarters at Ceske Budejovice and subsequent attempted attacks on the party's buildings in other cities have alarmed	25
authorities and led to heightened security at facilities across the country The regime reportedly believes these acts are the work of youth gangs controlled by unidentified foreigners.	25
unidentified foreigners.	25)
Comment: It is unclear whether this violence represents random	
protests or is the work of an organized opposition movement or outside group. The sketchiness suggests that such	n 25X
activity is not widespread. The regime will nonetheless employ whatever resources are necessary to contain quickly any antiregim violence before it escalates or results in major protests that could	ne
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whatever resources are necessary to contain quickly any antiregime violence before it escalates or results in major protests that could	









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	SURINAME: Labor Strife	
	Attempts by disgruntled bauxite workers to close the US-owned	
	Suralco refining facilities on Monday and periodic sabotage by insurgents may prompt the company to pull out of Suriname. The US	
	Embassy in Paramaribo reports that 80 bauxite workers tried to shut	25X1
	down the powerhouse at Suralco's Paranam alumina refinery. The	
	police dispersed workers. but a US official reports the refinery was damaged extensively.	25 X 1
V	says that workers had inreatened to close all Paranam operations	
	after the company laid off at least 500 workers last week when sabotage of powerlines by the rebels forced closure of the smelter.	
	According to the US Embassy, the company, which accounts for	
	50 percent of Suriname's hard currency earnings, has demanded major financial concessions from the Bouterse regime to stay in	
	Suriname.	25 X 1
	Commont: This is the first significant labor strife in Surineme since	
	Comment: This is the first significant labor strife in Suriname since 1984, when militant bauxite workers won tax concessions from the	
	Bouterse government. Continuing insurgent activity, coupled with the	
	labor problems and resultant damage, probably will cause the company to cease operations for an extended period—or possibly to	25 X 1
	close down entirely—even if it receives additional concessions.	0574
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25X1 4 February 1987

Top Secret 25X1 In Brief **Middle East** - Indirect flow of Libyan oil products from Europe to US down 25X1 . increased deliveries to 25X1 Italy, northern Europe . . . European demand for oil allowing Tripoli 25X1 to command premium prices. US-Embassy-reports Wang Renzhi to head China's propaganda **East Asia** 25X1 department, replacing protege of Hu Yaobang . . . influential in media campaign against liberalization, attacks on intellectuals . . . appointment shows increased conservative influence. 25X1 Chinese gold production up 14 percent last year . . . 25X1 estimate annual output at 50 tons . . . Beijing pushing 25X1 production, exports to bolster sagging foreign exchange holdings. 25X1 **Africa** Ethiopia to resume controversial resettlement program, probably 25X1 in March, according to Relief Commissioner . . . plans to move 180,000 people to remote regions by September . . . international attention may limit more flagrant human rights abuses. 25X1 25X1

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
Top Secret 25X1 **Special Analysis SOUTH KOREA: Human Rights Controversy Heats Up** The recent death of a South Korean student in police custody has reinvigorated President Chun's political opponents and set back 25X1 his timetable for constitutional reform. Despite the government's efforts at damage control, public indignation over recurring human rights abuses remains strong, increasing the prospect for large crowds at rallies scheduled this Saturday to protest torture. Seoul is ready to take harsher measures to prevent the opposition from capitalizing on the current mood, but the fallout from the torture issue raises the likelihood of political conflict this spring. 25X1 Opposition leaders are mobilizing a broad spectrum of religious and dissident groups for rallies in Seoul and 10 provincial cities to coincide with memorial services for the student. Rally sponsors claim that 20,000 volunteers are helping organize activities. 25X1 The government, in an attempt to diminish the turnout, has declared that the rallies are designed to foment social unrest and are therefore illegal. In addition, the press reports that police have intensified efforts to arrest student radicals, probably in an attempt to keep dissident extremists on the sidelines. 25X1 Despite the indictment of two police interrogators in the student's death and the promise of a special presidential committee to prevent further abuses, critics of the government have used the incident to highlight past human rights violations. According to the US Embassy. opposition lawmakers recently took advantage of a special parliamentary session called to investigate the student's death to grill government officials on Seoul's human rights record. 25X1 25X1 **Opposition Offensive** Leaders of the New Korea Democratic Party, the main opposition, see the rallies scheduled for Saturday as an opportunity to galvanize support for their platform—particularly their call for a directly elected president. 25X1 continued Top Secret

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4 February 1987

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Risks for Both Sides		
The opposition is banking heavily on its abilit	y to convert public	
outrage into political capital. Street rallies on open the party to a potentially embarrassing	setback such as	
occurred last fall when public apathy—as mudeployment of riot police—scuttled opposition	ich as massive	
broadbased support.	in enorts to mobilize	25 X 1
The human rights focus of the organizers nor	netheless raises risks for	
the government. For example, any police inte	erference in religious	
services would give credence to opposition c real commitment to political liberalization. Th	is would reinforce the	
suspicions of many South Koreans that Chun reform solely as a means to perpetuate his per	sees constitutional	
Telorin solely as a means to perpetuate his pe	ower beyond 1966.	25 X 1
Even if the rallies pass without serious incide	nt Chun will not be out	
of the woods. The public and the opposition v	will be watching the	
police trial and the proceedings of the watche of a coverup.	log committee for signs	25X1
If Chun gives the committee broad powers, the	an investigation could	
produce politically explosive findings.	ie investigation could	25 X 1
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In any event, failure to contain the human rigil	hts issue will bog down	
Chun's efforts to move forward on the constitution this spring.	iutional revision issue	25X1



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The current programs have done little to reform popular lifestyles. Even though some groups, such as the Catholic Church and Solidarity in Poland, are supportive of antialcohol campaigns, widespread distrust of regime motivations tends to undermine popular support for any such government initiative. Most East Europeans probably will continue to react to these appeals, as they have to other mobilization campaigns, by shrugging them off and seeking new methods of circumvention.

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